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STRUCTURAL CONNECTIONS BETWEEN A FORCING CLASS AND
ITS MODAL LOGIC
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS, GEORGE LEIBMAN, AND BENEDIKT LO¨WE
Abstract. Every definable forcing class Γ gives rise to a corresponding forcing modality,
for which Γ ϕ means that ϕ is true in all Γ extensions, and the valid principles of Γ forcing
are the modal assertions that are valid for this forcing interpretation. For example, [9] shows
that if ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provably valid principles of the class of all forcing
are precisely the assertions of the modal theory S4.2. In this article, we prove similarly that
the provably valid principles of collapse forcing, Cohen forcing and other classes are in each
case exactly S4.3; the provably valid principles of c.c.c. forcing, proper forcing, and others
are each contained within S4.3 and do not contain S4.2; the provably valid principles of
countably closed forcing, CH-preserving forcing and others are each exactly S4.2; and the
provably valid principles of ω1-preserving forcing are contained within S4.tBA. All these
results arise from general structural connections we have identified between a forcing class
and the modal logic of forcing to which it gives rise.
1. Introduction
In [9], we considered the modal logic of forcing, which arises when one considers a model
of set theory in the context of all its forcing extensions, interpreting  as “in all forcing
extensions” and ♦ as “in some forcing extension”. This modal language allows one easily to
express sweeping general principles concerning forcing absoluteness and the effect of forcing
on truth in set theory, such as the assertion ♦ϕ → ♦ϕ, expressing that every possibly
necessary statement is necessarily possible, which the reader may verify is valid for the
forcing interpretation, or the assertion ♦ϕ → ϕ, that every possibly necessary statement
is true, which is an equivalent formulation of the maximality principle [8, 17], a forcing axiom
independent of but equiconsistent with ZFC. It was known from [8] that the valid principles
of forcing include all the assertions of the modal theory S4.2, and the main theorem of [9]
established that if ZFC is consistent, then in fact the ZFC-provably valid principles of forcing
are exactly the assertions of S4.2.
In this article, we consider more generally the modal logic of various particular kinds of
forcing, such as c.c.c. forcing or ω1-preserving forcing, by relativizing the modal operators
to such a class. In [9], a number of connections between various modal axioms and corre-
sponding operations on the class of forcing notions had surfaced: for instance, the validity of
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the axiom .2 mentioned above is linked to the operation of finite products of forcing notions
[9, p. 1794]. In this article, we shall uncover further such structural connections between a
class of forcing notions and the modal logic of forcing to which it gives rise, and use these
connections to settle the exact modal logic of several natural forcing classes, while providing
new bounds on several others. We have aimed to provide general tools, including the control
statements of §4 and their connection to the forcing validities, which seem promising to en-
able set theorists to undertake an investigation of the modal logic of additional forcing classes
by means of a forcing-only analysis (requiring no substantial modal logic), by discovering
which kinds of control statements their forcing class supports.
For example, using these methods we prove in this article that the provably valid principles
of collapse forcing, Cohen forcing and other classes are in each case exactly S4.3 (theorems
24 and 31); the provably valid principles of c.c.c. forcing, proper forcing, and others are each
contained within S4.3 and do not contain S4.2 (corollary 33); the provably valid principles of
countably closed forcing, CH-preserving forcing and others are each exactly S4.2 (theorems
34 and 37); and the provably valid principles of ω1-preserving forcing are contained within
S4.tBA (theorem 36).
The forcing interpretation of modal logic was introduced in [8], with a deeper more explicit
investigation in [9]. Various other aspects of the modal logic of forcing are considered in
[13, 10, 5, 6, 14, 16, 4, 3]. We consider this article a natural successor to [9].
2. Modal logic background
The modal logic of forcing involves an interplay between two formal languages, which
we sharply distinguish, namely (i) the language of propositional modal logic L, which
has propositional variables, logical connectives and the modal operators  and ♦ (where
♦ϕ is defined as ¬¬ϕ; and (ii) the usual first-order language of set theory L∈, which has
variables, quantifiers, logical connectives and the relations = and ∈. One may regard a modal
assertion ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) as a template for the scheme of set-theoretic assertions ϕ(ψ1, . . . , ψn)
which arise by the substitution of set-theoretic assertions ψi for the propositional variables
pi and the forcing interpretation of the modal operators. The nature of this translation
will be further investigated in §3. Meanwhile, in this section, let us introduce the modal
theories that will arise in that analysis. Using the following axioms (with their established
nomenclature)
K (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
T ϕ→ ϕ
4 ϕ→ ϕ
.2 ♦ϕ→ ♦ϕ
.3 (♦ϕ ∧ ♦ψ)→ ♦[(ϕ ∧ ♦ψ) ∨ (ψ ∧ ♦ϕ)]
5 ♦ϕ→ ϕ,
we define the desired modal theories, where in each case we close the axioms under modus
ponens and necessitation:
S4 = K+ T+ 4
S4.2 = K+ T+ 4 + .2
S4.3 = K+ T+ 4 + .3
S5 = K+ T+ 4 + 5.
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It is not difficult to see that S4 ⊢ 5 → .3 and S4 ⊢ .3 → .2, and consequently S4 ⊆ S4.2 ⊆
S4.3 ⊆ S5.
The Kripke model concept provides a robust semantics for modal logic: a Kripke model is
a collectionM of possible worlds, each providing truth values for the propositional variables,
together with a relation on the worlds called the accessibility relation. The frame of such a
model is this accessibility relation, disregarding the truth assignments of the worlds. Modal
truth is defined by induction in the natural way, so that ϕ is true at a world in M , if
ϕ is true in all accessible worlds, and similarly ♦ϕ is true at a world if ϕ is true at some
accessible world. We write JvKM for the set of L-formulas true at v in M and note that
this is a set closed under modus ponens.
If F is a frame, a modal assertion is valid for F if it is true at all worlds of all Kripke
models having F as a frame. If C is a class of frames, a modal theory is sound with respect
to C if every assertion in the theory is valid for every frame in C. A modal theory is complete
with respect to C if every assertion valid for every frame in C is in the theory. Finally, a
modal theory is characterized by C (equivalently, C characterizes the modal theory) if it is
both sound and complete with respect to C [11, p. 40].
It turns out that all the modal theories we mentioned are characterized by certain classes
of finite Kripke frames. For the rest of this section, we mention the completeness results of
which we shall subsequently make use. Numerous further completeness results can be found
in [2].
A pre-order is a reflexive transitive relation. Every pre-order ≤ admits a quotient by the
equivalence x ≡ y ↔ x ≤ y ≤ x, and this quotient will be a partial order. Thus, a pre-order
is obtained from a partial order by replacing each node with a cluster of equivalent nodes.
A linear pre-order is a pre-order in which any two nodes are comparable.
Theorem 1. The modal logic S4.3 is characterized by the class of finite linear pre-order
frames. That is, a modal assertion is derivable in S4.3 if and only if it holds in all Kripke
models having a finite linear pre-ordered frame.
Proof. Cf. [2, corollary 5.18 & theorem5.33] or [1, exercise 4.33, theorem4.96, & lemma6.40].

Every finite Boolean algebra partial order is isomorphic to the set of subsets of a finite set,
ordered by inclusion. Of course, this algebra also has the structure of meets (intersection),
joins (unions) and negation (complements), with a smallest element 0 and a largest element
1. A pre-Boolean algebra is a partial pre-order 〈B,≤〉, such that the quotient by the relation
x ≡ y ↔ x ≤ y ≤ x is a Boolean algebra. Thus, every pre-Boolean algebra is obtained from
a Boolean algebra by replacing each node in the Boolean algebra by a cluster of equivalent
nodes.
Theorem 2 ([9, theorem11]). The modal logic S4.2 is characterized by the class of finite
pre-Boolean algebras. That is, a modal assertion is derivable in S4.2 if and only if it holds
in all Kripke models having a finite pre-Boolean algebra frame.
Theorem 3. The modal logic S5 is characterized by the class of finite equivalence relations
with one equivalence class (a single cluster).
Proof. Cf. [2, corollaries 5.19 & 5.29] or [1, theorems 4.29, 4.96 & exercise 6.6.4]. 
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We have observed another modal theory to arise several times in the modal logic of various
forcing classes, and so let us now introduce it. This is the logic of finite topless pre-Boolean
algebras. A topless Boolean algebra is obtained from a Boolean algebra by omitting the top
element 1. Thus, a finite topless Boolean algebra is isomorphic to the collection of strictly
proper subsets of a given finite set. A topless pre-Boolean algebra is a partial pre-order
(transitive and reflexive), such that the natural quotient by the relation x ≡ y ↔ x ≤ y ≤ x
is a topless Boolean algebra. We define the modal theory S4.tBA, or topless pre-Boolean
algebra logic, to be the collection of all modal assertions that are true in all Kripke models
whose frame is a finite topless pre-Boolean algebra. Thus, by definition, this logic is complete
with respect to the class of finite topless pre-Boolean algebras. This logic is the smallest
modal companion of a well-known intermediate logic called Medvedev’s Logic ML.1
Observation 4. S4.tBA is properly contained within S4.2.
Proof. First, we argue that S4.tBA is contained in S4.2 by arguing that every Kripke model
M with a finite pre-Boolean algebra frame admits a model bisimilarity with a Kripke model
M+ having a finite topless pre-Boolean algebra frame. Consider first the case where the
frame underlying M is actually a Boolean algebra. We construct M+ as follows: take the
Boolean algebra that is the frame ofM , add a new atom and consider the resulting generated
Boolean algebra; then remove the top to create a topless Boolean algebra. In the resulting
frame, keep the original worlds for the nodes that came from M and place the top world of
M at each of the newly created nodes of the frame ofM+. It is easy to check thatM andM+
have a model bisimulation associating each of the new worlds to the top world ofM , and the
other worlds to themselves. It follows that the truths of M and M+ at their initial worlds
are the same. Similarly, for the general case where the frame of M is a finite pre-Boolean
algebra rather than a Boolean algebra, then there is a cluster of mutually accessible nodes
at the top of M , and it is this entire cluster that we duplicate in M+ at each of the new
positions in the topless Boolean algebra. Again there is a model bisimulation of M and M+
associating each of these newly created worlds with their corresponding duplicate in the top
cluster of M and the other worlds to themselves. Thus, again the truths of M and M+ at
their initial worlds are the same. Finally, since any statement outside S4.2 must fail in such
a Kripke model M with a finite pre-Boolean algebra frame, it follows that the statement
also fails in the corresponding Kripke model M+ with a finite topless pre-Boolean algebra
frame, and so it is also outside S4.tBA, as desired. So S4.tBA is included in S4.2.
Second, we argue that this inclusion is strict. As the topless Boolean algebras are not
directed, it is easy to construct violations of .2 by making a statement true on one co-atom
and false on another. So .2 is not in S4.tBA, and consequently S4.tBA ( S4.2, as desired. 
Since S4 is valid in any topless Boolean algebra, it follows that S4 ⊆ S4.tBA. This conclu-
sion is strict in light of the fact that all topless Boolean algebras satisfy the principle that
whenever three mutually incompatible assertions are possibly necessary, then it is possible
1An intermediate logic is a propositional logic between intuitionistic and classical logic. A modal logic Λ
is a modal companion of an intermediate logic Λ′ if Λ consists of the Go¨del translations of formulas in Λ′. If
Λ is characterized by a class C in the above sense, and Λ′ is characterized in the sense of Kripke semantics
for intermediate logics by the same class C, then Λ is the smallest modal companion of Λ′. Medvedev’s
Logic ML is characterized by the class of finite topless pre-Boolean algebras and known not to be finitely
axiomatizable [7, 15].
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to exclude one of them without yet deciding between the other two. This is expressible in
the modal language as
♦ϕ1 ∧ ♦ϕ2 ∧ ♦ϕ3 ∧ ¬♦[(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) ∨ (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3) ∨ (ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3)]
→ ♦[♦ϕ1 ∧ ♦ϕ2 ∧ ¬♦ϕ3],
and there are similar assertions for four possibilities and five and so on. The assertion above
is valid for S4.tBA but not for S4 (consider a frame that is a tree with one root and three
leaves), and thus we may summarize the situation as
S4 ( S4.tBA ( S4.2 ( S4.3 ( S5.
We close this section with two simple modal logic observations that will be of use in §§ 5.7
and 5.8.
Observation 5. The modal logic S4 proves .2→  .2.
Proof. The following simple chain of transformations proves the claim, using the fact that
♦♦ϕ implies ♦ϕ in S4:
¬ .2 = ¬(♦ϕ→ ♦ϕ)⇒ ♦(♦ϕ ∧ ¬♦ϕ)
⇒ ♦♦ϕ ∧ ♦¬♦ϕ
⇒ ♦♦ϕ ∧ ♦♦¬ϕ
⇒ ♦ϕ ∧ ♦¬ϕ
⇒ ♦ϕ ∧ ¬♦ϕ
⇒ ¬(♦ϕ→ ♦ϕ) = ¬.2

Observation 6. Let Λ and A be sets of L-formulas, and let Λ
∗ be the closure of Λ ∪ A
under modus ponens and necessitation. Let M be a transitive Kripke model and v ∈ M .
Assume that (1) for each w ∈ M , we have Λ ⊆ JwKM , and (2) for each α ∈ A, we have
α ∈ JvKM . Then for every w accessible from v, we have Λ
∗ ⊆ JwKM .
Proof. The set Λ∗ can be written as
⋃
n∈ω Λn where Λ0 := Λ∪A, Λ2n+1 is the closure of Λ2n
under modus ponens, and Λ2n+2 := Λ2n+1 ∪ {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Λ2n+1 }.
We’ll prove by induction that Λ∗ ⊆ JwKM for all w accessible from v. The base case
follows from assumptions (1) and (2). Since each JwKM is closed under modus ponens, the
step 2n 7→ 2n + 1 is trivial. For the step 2n + 1 7→ 2n + 2, fix w accessible from v and ϕ
in Λ2n+1, and show that ϕ ∈ JwKM . Let w
′ be accessible from w; by transitivity, we have
that w′ is accessible from v, and thus, ϕ ∈ Jw′K. Since w′ was arbitrary, ϕ ∈ JwK. 
3. Forcing with a forcing class Γ
Suppose that Γ is a fixed definable class of forcing notions, with a fixed definition. We
freely interpret this definition in any model of set theory, thereby reading Γ de dicto rather
than de re. We say that Γ is a forcing class if in every such model, this definition defines a
class of forcing notions, closed under the equivalence of forcing. A forcing class Γ is reflexive
if in every model of set theory, Γ contains the trivial forcing poset. In this case, every model
of set theory is a Γ forcing extension of itself. The class Γ is transitive if it closed under
finite iterations, in the sense that if Q ∈ Γ and R˙ ∈ ΓV
Q
, then Q ∗ R˙ ∈ Γ. Thus, any Γ forcing
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extension of a Γ forcing extension is a Γ forcing extension. The class Γ is closed under
product forcing if, necessarily, whenever Q and R are in Γ, then so is Q × R. Related to this,
Γ is persistent if, necessarily, members of Γ are Γ necessarily in Γ; that is, if P,Q ∈ Γ implies
P ∈ ΓV
Q
in all models. These properties are related in that every transitive persistent class
is closed under products, since Q × R is forcing equivalent to Q ∗ Rˇ. The class Γ is directed if
whenever P,Q ∈ Γ, then there is R ∈ Γ, such that both P and Q are factors of R by further
Γ forcing, that is, if R is forcing equivalent to P ∗ S˙ for some S˙ ∈ ΓV
P
and also equivalent
to Q ∗ T˙ for some T˙ ∈ ΓV
Q
. This is stronger than asserting merely that any two members
of Γ are absorbed by some other forcing in Γ, since we require that the quotient forcing is
also in Γ. Note that if Γ is transitive and persistent, then product forcing shows that Γ is
directed. The class Γ has the linearity property if for any two forcing notions P,Q, then one
of them is forcing equivalent to the other one followed by additional Γ forcing; that is, either
P is forcing equivalent to Q ∗ R˙ for some R˙ ∈ ΓV
Q
or Q is forcing equivalent to P ∗ R˙ for some
R˙ ∈ ΓV
Q
. Combining these notions, we define that Γ is a linear forcing class if Γ is reflexive,
transitive and has the linearity property. Any linear forcing class is clearly directed. Similar
related definitions can be found in [13].
Any forcing class Γ leads to the corresponding Γ forcing modalities. Namely, a set-theoretic
sentence ψ is Γ-forceable or Γ-possible, written ♦Γ ψ, if ψ holds in a forcing extension by some
forcing notion in Γ, and ψ is Γ-necessary, written Γ ψ, if ψ holds in all forcing extensions by
forcing notions in Γ. These modal operators are easily seen to obey certain modal validities,
such as the following, for any class Γ.
K Γ(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Γ ϕ→ Γ ψ), and
Dual ♦Γ ϕ↔ ¬Γ ¬ϕ.
The validity of other statements will depend on the class Γ. A modal assertion ϕ(p0, . . . , pn)
is a valid principle of Γ forcing if all substitution instances ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn) hold under the
Γ-forcing interpretation, where we substitute arbitrary set-theoretic assertions ψi for the
propositional variables pi and interpret  as Γ. More formally, for any forcing class Γ, every
assignment pi 7→ ψi of the propositional variables pi to set-theoretical assertions ψi extends
recursively to a Γ forcing translation, a function H : L → L∈ satisfying H(pi) = ψi and the
obvious recursive rules for conjunction H(ϕ∧ η) = H(ϕ)∧H(η), negation H(¬ϕ) = ¬H(ϕ)
and modality H(ϕ) = ΓH(ϕ), where in this last case we mean the assertion in the
language of set theory asserting that H(ϕ) has Boolean value one for any forcing notion
satisfying the definition of Γ. In this terminology, the modal logic of Γ forcing over a model
of set theory W is the set
{ϕ ∈ L |W |= H(ϕ) for all Γ forcing translations H }.
Note that the interpretation of iterated modal expressions, such as ♦ΓΓ ψ, leads to the
situation where Γ is reinterpreted in the appropriate forcing extensions by forcing in Γ. For
example, the c.c.c. forcing notions of a c.c.c. forcing extension do not necessarily include
all the c.c.c. forcing notions of the original ground model. To improve readability, we will
sometimes omit the subscripts from ♦Γ and Γ when the class Γ is clear.
Theorem 7 ([13]).
(1) S4 is valid for any reflexive transitive forcing class.
(2) S4.2 is valid for any reflexive transitive directed forcing class.
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(3) S4.3 is valid for any linear forcing class.
Proof. The reader is encouraged to work through the details as an exercise in understanding
the forcing modalities. Axiom K is valid for any forcing class. Axiom T is valid for any
reflexive forcing class. Axiom 4 is valid for any transitive forcing class. Axiom .2 is valid
for any directed forcing class. And axiom .3 is valid for any forcing class with the linearity
property. We note that one subtlety of the argument is that it is not sufficient merely to
check the validity of the axioms K, T, 4 and .3 alone, since the theory S4.3, for example,
is defined to be the closure of these axioms under modus ponens and necessitation. Thus,
one needs to know that the axioms remain valid in any Γ extension. In our case here, the
definition of what it means to be a linear class requires that the desired property holds in
all models, which is more than sufficient. 
The construction used in the next lemma lies at the heart of our method, serving as the
principal technique connecting modal truth in Kripke models with set-theoretic truth in
models of set theory. It is a general version of [9, lemma 7.1], employing the notion of a
Γ-labeling, which we introduce here.
Definition 8. A Γ-labeling of a frame F for a model of set theory W is an assignment to
each node w in F an assertion Φw in the language of set theory, such that
(1) The statements Φw form a mutually exclusive partition of truth in the Γ forcing
extensions of W , meaning that every such extension W [G] satisfies exactly one Φw.
(2) Any Γ forcing extension W [G] in which Φw is true satisfies ♦Φu if and only if w ≤F u.
(3) W |= Φw0 , where w0 is a given initial element of F .
The formal assertion of these properties is called the Jankov-Fine formula for F (cf. [9,
§ 7]).
Lemma 9. Suppose that w 7→ Φw is a Γ-labeling of a finite frame F for a model of set theory
W and that w0 is an initial world of F . Then for any Kripke model M having frame F ,
there is an assignment of the propositional variables to set-theoretic assertions p 7→ ψp such
that for any modal assertion ϕ(p0, . . . , pk),
(M,w0) |= ϕ(p0, . . . , pk) iff W |= ϕ(ψp0, . . . , ψpk).
In particular, any modal assertion ϕ that fails at w0 inM also fails in W under the Γ forcing
interpretation. Consequently, the modal logic of Γ forcing over W is contained in the modal
logic of assertions valid in F .
Proof. Suppose that w 7→ Φw is a Γ-labeling of F for W , and suppose that M is a Kripke
model with frame F . Thus, we may view each w ∈ F as a propositional world in M . For
each propositional variable p, let ψp =
∨
{Φw | (M,w) |= p }, the join of the set-theoretic
statements Φw associated with each world w where p is true inM . We shall prove the lemma
by proving the more uniform claim that whenever W [G] is a Γ forcing extension of W and
W [G] |= Φw, then
(M,w) |= ϕ(p0, . . . , pk) iff W [G] |= ϕ(ψp0 , . . . , ψpk).
We prove this for all such W [G] simultaneously by induction on the complexity of ϕ. The
atomic case follows immediately from the definition of ψp. Boolean combinations go through
easily. Consider now the modal operator case. If W [G] |= ♦ϕ(ψp0 , . . . , ψpk), then there is a
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further Γ extensionW [G][H ] satisfying ϕ(ψp0, . . . , ψpk). This extensionW [G][H ] must satisfy
some Φu, and consequently by induction we know (M,u) |= ϕ(p0, . . . , pk). Since Φu was Γ
forceable over W [G], where Φw was true, it follows by the labeling properties that w ≤F u.
Thus, (M,w) |= ♦ϕ(p0, . . . , pk), as desired. Conversely, if (M,w) |= ♦ϕ(p0, . . . , pk), then
there is a u with w ≤F u and (M,u) |= ϕ(p0, . . . , pk). Thus, by induction, any Γ forcing
extension with Φu will satisfy ϕ(ψp0 , . . . , ψpk). Since Φu is forceable over any Γ extension
W [G] with Φw, it follows that any such W [G] will satisfy ♦ϕ(ψp0, . . . , ψpk), as desired.
The further final claims in the lemma now follow immediately. 
4. Control statements: buttons, switches and ratchets
In the previous section, we reduced much of the problem of determining the modal logic of
Γ forcing to the question of whether certain kinds of frames admit Γ-labelings. In this section,
we shall prove that the existence of such labelings for large classes of finite frames often
breaks down into simpler, more modular control statements, such as what we call buttons,
switches and ratchets. Since labelings of complex frames can be constructed from these
more fundamental control statements, the question of whether a given class of frames admit
labelings often reduces to the question of whether the forcing class allows for independent
families of these control statements.
Buttons and switches were introduced in [9]; here, we shall augment them with ratchets,
weak buttons and other types of control statements. Suppose that Γ is a reflexive transitive
forcing class. A switch for Γ is a statement s such that both s and ¬s are Γ necessarily
possible. A button for Γ is a statement b that is Γ necessarily possibly necessary. In the case
that S4.2 is valid for Γ, this is equivalent to saying that b is possibly necessary. The button
b is pushed when  b holds, and otherwise it is unpushed. A finite collection of buttons and
switches (or other controls of this type) is independent if necessarily, each can be operated
without affecting the truth of the others. For more details, cf. [9, p. 1798]. A button b is
pure if whenever it becomes true, it becomes necessarily true, that is, if (b→  b). Every
(unpushed) button b has a corresponding (unpushed) pure button  b, and pure buttons are
sometimes more convenient.
A sequence of first-order statements r1, r2, . . . rn is a ratchet for Γ of length n if each is an
unpushed pure button for Γ, each necessarily implies the previous, and each can be pushed
without pushing the next (this notion was called a volume control in [9]). This is expressed
formally as follows:
¬ri
(ri →  ri)
(ri+1 → ri)
[¬ri+1 → ♦(ri ∧ ¬ri+1)]
The key idea of a ratchet is that it is unidirectional, any further Γ forcing can only increase
the ratchet value or leave it the same. It is sometimes convenient to introduce the ratchet
statement r0 as any tautological statement ⊤ (an already-pushed button). A model has
ratchet value (or volume) at least i when ri holds and exactly i when ri∧¬ri+1 holds, for i < n;
ratchet value exactly n means rn is true. Further Γ forcing pushes the value only higher,
and any higher value is precisely attainable in an appropriate extension. A ratchet of length
n partitions the Γ forcing extensions into n + 1 equivalence classes—those having the same
ratchet value—and from any model in a lower ratchet class, one can perform further Γ forcing
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to arrive at a model in any desired higher class. If r1, r2, . . . rn is a ratchet and s0, s1, . . . sk
are switches, then this combined family is independent if in any extension, any finite pattern
of the switches is obtainable without increasing the ratchet value. A transfinite sequence of
set-theoretic statements 〈rα | 0 < α < δ〉, perhaps involving parameters, is a ratchet for Γ of
length δ if each is an unpushed pure button for Γ, each necessarily implies the previous, and
each can be pushed without pushing the next. The ratchet is uniform if there is a formula
r(x) with one free variable, such that rα = r(α). Every finite length ratchet is uniform.
The ratchet is continuous, if for every limit ordinal λ < δ, the statement rλ is equivalent
to ∀α<λ rα. Any uniform ratchet can be made continuous by reindexing, replacing each rβ
by the assertion “∀α<β rα+1.” A long ratchet is a uniform ratchet 〈rα | 0 < α < ORD〉
of length ORD, with the additional property that no Γ forcing extension satisfies all rα, so
that every Γ extension exhibits some ordinal ratchet value. We will explain in theorem 12
that from a long ratchet, one may construct a mutually independent family of switches and
a ratchet of any desired length.
A weak button is a statement b that is possibly necessary. We have mentioned that under
S4.2, every weak button is a button, but without S4.2, this conclusion does not follow, and
it can be that a statement b and its negation ¬b are both weak buttons for a given class of
forcing. For example, if Γ is c.c.c. forcing, then the assertion “the L-least Souslin tree has a
branch” and its negation are both weak buttons, since one can either add a branch, which
pushes the button, or specialize the tree, which prevents branches and therefore pushes the
negation. A sequence of weak buttons b0, . . . , bn−1 is strongly independent if no extension has
all of them pushed, but in any extension, any additional one of them can be pushed without
pushing any of the others, as long as this wouldn’t push them all. Such a family is similar
to an independent family of buttons, except that one cannot push them all.
The next three theorems were implicit in [9], but we revisit them here explicitly in the
context of an arbitrary forcing class Γ. Let us begin with the easiest case.
Theorem 10. If Γ is a reflexive transitive forcing class having arbitrarily large finite in-
dependent families of switches over a model of set theory W , then the valid principles of Γ
forcing over W are contained within the modal theory S5.
Proof. Suppose that Γ is a reflexive transitive forcing class and that W is a model of set
theory having arbitrarily large finite independent families of switches. We may assume that
the switches are all off in W . By theorem 3, any modal assertion not in S5 fails in a Kripke
model M built on a frame F consisting of a single cluster of worlds w0, w1, . . . , wn−1, each
accessible from all of them. By adding dummy copies of worlds in this Kripke model (which
does not affect modal truth), we may assume that n = 2m for some natural number m. Let
s0, s1, . . . sm−1 be an independent family of m switches over W . We will provide a Γ-labeling
of this frame. For any j < 2m, let Φwj be the assertion that the overall pattern of truth
values for the switches conforms with the m binary digits of j. Thus, we have associated each
world wj of the frame ofM with a set-theoretic assertion Φwj . These assertions are mutually
exclusive, since different j will lead to different incompatible patterns for the switches in
Φj , and exhaustive, since every model must exhibit some pattern of switches. Since the
switches are independent over W , any pattern of switches is Γ necessarily Γ forceable, and
so every Γ extension W [G] satisfies ♦Φwj for all j. Since the switches are all off in W , we
have W |= Φw0 . Thus, we have verified the three labeling requirements, and so by lemma 9,
there is an assignment of the propositional variables p to set-theoretic assertions ψp such that
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(M,w0) |= ϕ(p0, . . . , pk) if and only if W |= ϕ(ψp0 , . . . , ψpk). In particular, any statement ϕ
that fails in M at w0 has a set-theoretic substitution instance ϕ(ψp0 , . . . , ψpk) failing in W .
Since any statement outside S5 fails in such an (M,w0), it follows that the modal logic of Γ
forcing over W is contained within S5, as desired. 
Theorem 11. If Γ is a reflexive transitive forcing class having arbitrarily long finite ratchets
over a model of set theory W , mutually independent with arbitrarily large finite families of
switches, then the valid principles of Γ forcing over W are contained within the modal theory
S4.3.
Proof. Suppose that Γ is a reflexive transitive forcing class with arbitrarily long finite ratch-
ets, mutually independent of switches over a model of set theory W . By theorem 1, any
modal assertion not in S4.3 must fail in a Kripke model M built on a finite pre-linear order
frame. Thus, by lemma 9, it suffices to provide a Γ labeling of the frame of M . This frame
consists of a finite increasing sequence of n clusters of mutually accessible worlds. That is,
the kth cluster consists of nk many worlds w
k
0 , w
k
1 , . . . , w
k
nk−1
, and the frame order is simply
wki ≤ w
s
j if and only if k ≤ s. By adding dummy copies of worlds in each cluster, which does
not affect truth in the Kripke model, we may assume that all clusters have the same size
and furthermore, that nk = 2
m for some fixed natural number m.
Let r1, . . . , rn be a ratchet of length n for Γ over W , mutually independent from the m
many switches s0, . . . , sm−1. We may assume that all switches are off in W . Let r¯k be
the assertion that the ratchet value is exactly k, so that r¯0 = ¬r1, r¯k = rk ∧ ¬rk+1 for
1 ≤ k < n and r¯n = rn, and let s¯j assert for j < 2
m that the pattern of switches accords
with the m binary digits of j. We associate each world wkj , where k < n and j < 2
m,
with the assertion Φwkj = r¯k ∧ s¯j , which asserts that the ratchet value is exactly k and the
switches exhibit pattern j. Since the ratchet values cannot go down, any pattern of switches
is possible without increasing the ratchet value, and any value is possible, it follows that
the Γ possibility of Φw corresponds exactly with the order in the frame. That is, whenever
W [G] satisfies Φwkj , then it satisfies ♦ΓΦw
s
i
if and only if wkj ≤ w
s
i , which is to say, if and
only if k ≤ s. Also, since the ratchet value is 0 in W itself and the switches are off, we
have that W |= Φw00 , and so we have provided a Γ-labeling of the frame of M . It follows
by lemma 9 that there is an assignment of the propositional variables p to set-theoretic
assertions ψp such that for any modal assertion ϕ we have (M,w0) |= ϕ(p0, . . . , pt) if and
only if W |= ϕ(ψp0 , . . . , ψpt). In particular, by theorem 1, any statement outside S4.3 will
fail in such an M , and consequently will have a failing substitution instance in W under the
Γ forcing interpretation. Thus, the valid principles of Γ forcing over W are contained within
S4.3, as desired. 
It turns out that in most of the set-theoretic situations where we are able to build ratchets,
we are also able to build a long ratchet, and in this case the next theorem allows us to simplify
things by avoiding the need to consider switches.
Theorem 12. If Γ is a reflexive transitive forcing class having a long ratchet over a model
of set theory W , then the valid principles of Γ forcing over W are contained within the modal
theory S4.3.
Proof. Suppose that 〈rα | 0 < α < ORD〉 is a long ratchet over W , that is, a uniform ratchet
control of length ORD, such that no Γ extension satisfies every rα. We may assume the
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ratchet is continuous. It suffices by theorem 11 to produce arbitrarily long finite ratchets
independent from arbitrarily large finite families of switches. To do this, we shall divide
the ordinals into blocks of length ω, and think of the position within one such a block as
determining a switch pattern and the choice of block itself as another ratchet. Specifically,
every ordinal can be uniquely expressed in the form ω ·α+ k, where k < ω, and we think of
this ordinal as being the kth element in the αth block. Let si be the statement that if the
current ratchet value is exactly ω · α + k, then the ith binary bit of k is 1. Let vα be the
assertion rω·α, which expresses that the current ratchet value is in the αth block of ordinals
of length ω or higher. Since we may freely increase the ratchet value to any higher value,
we may increase the value of k while staying in the same block of ordinals, and so the vα
form themselves a ratchet, mutually independent of the switches si. Thus, by theorem 11,
the valid principles of Γ forcing over W are contained within S4.3. 
Theorem 13. If Γ is a reflexive transitive forcing class and there are arbitrarily large finite
families of mutually independent buttons and switches over a model of set theory W , then
the valid principles of Γ forcing over W are contained within S4.2.
Proof. This was the main application of this technique in [9], applied to the class of all
forcing. The point is that when you have mutually independent buttons and switches, you
can label any finite pre-Boolean algebra.
Suppose that Γ is a reflexive transitive forcing class having arbitrarily large finite families
of mutually independent buttons and switches over a model of set theory W . Suppose that
M is a Kripke model whose frame F is a finite pre-Boolean algebra. Thus, the quotient of F
by the equivalence relation w ≡ v ↔ w ≤ v ≤ w is a finite Boolean algebra B, which must
be a power set P (A) of a finite set A. Each element a ∈ B is associated with a cluster of
worlds wa0 , . . . , w
a
ka
. By adding dummy worlds to each cluster, we may assume that all the
clusters have size ka = 2
m for some fixed m. Suppose that A has size n, so that there are
n atoms in the Boolean algebra. Thus, the frame F can be thought of as worlds waj , where
a ⊆ A and j < 2m, with the order waj ≤ w
c
i if and only if a ⊆ c.
Associate each element i ∈ A with a pure button bi, such that these form a mutually
independent family with m many switches s0, . . . , sm−1. For j < 2
m, let s¯j be the assertion
that the pattern of switches corresponds to the binary digits of j. We label the world waj with
the assertion Φwaj = (
∧
i∈a bi) ∧ s¯j. If W [G] satisfies Φwaj , then by the mutual independence
of the buttons and switches, we conclude thatW [G] satisfies ♦Φwcr if and only if a ⊆ c, since
any prescribed larger collection of buttons can be pushed and the switches can be set to any
pattern without pushing any additional buttons. Also, since none of the buttons is pushed
and all the switches are off in W , we have W |= Φw∅0 . Thus, we have provided a Γ labeling
of the frame for W .
By lemma 9, therefore, there is an assignment of the propositional variables p 7→ ψp such
that (M,w∅0 ) |= ϕ(p0, . . . , pk) if and only if W |= ϕ(ψp0, . . . , ψpk). In particular, any ϕ
failing at (M,w∅0 ) will have a substitutions instance failing in W . By theorem 2, any modal
assertion outside S4.2 fails in such a Kripke model (M,w∅0 ), and so the valid principles of Γ
forcing over W will be contained in S4.2, as desired. 
Corollary 14. If Γ is a reflexive transitive directed forcing class and there are arbitrarily
large finite families of mutually independent buttons and switches over a model of set theory
W , then the valid principles of Γ forcing over W are exactly S4.2.
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Proof. The lower bound is provided by theorem 7, and the upper bound by theorem 13. 
Let us say that a modelW of set theory admits a uniform family of ORD many independent
buttons for Γ forcing, if there is a formula ϕ in the language of set theory such that the
assertions bα = ϕ(α), for each ordinal α in W , form an independent family of buttons for Γ
forcing, and furthermore any forcing extension of W pushes at most boundedly many of the
buttons. With such a large collection of buttons, as in theorem 12, we may avoid the need
in theorem 13 to also have independent switches.
Theorem 15. If Γ is a reflexive transitive forcing class and W is a model of set theory
having a uniform family of ORD many independent buttons, then the valid principles of Γ
forcing over W are contained within S4.2.
Proof. The idea is simply to keep the first ω many buttons as buttons and to use the rest
of the buttons to form a long ratchet by looking at the supremum of the pushed buttons
beyond ω. This ratchet gives rise to independent switches as in theorem 12, and so one has
a family of independent buttons and switches for Γ forcing over W . It follows by theorem
13 that the valid principles of Γ forcing over W is contained in S4.2. 
Theorem 16. If Γ is a reflexive transitive forcing class and there are arbitrarily large finite
families of strongly independent weak buttons and switches over a model of set theory W ,
then the valid principles of Γ forcing over W are contained within S4.tBA.
Proof. This argument proceeds almost identically to the proof of theorem 13, except that
here the pre-Boolean algebras will be topless. The impossibility of pushing all the weak
buttons corresponds exactly to the absence of the top element in the Boolean algebra, so the
corresponding labeling works here for the topless pre-Boolean algebra. 
Let us conclude this section with an aside, briefly correcting a flaw in our paper [9] con-
cerning the existence of independent buttons for forcing over L. These families exist, as
explained in the following, but Jakob Rittberg noticed that the particular buttons we had
proposed in the proof of [9, lemma 6.1] were problematic. Specifically, we had claimed there
that the buttons bn stating that “ω
L
n is not a cardinal” form a family of independent buttons
for forcing over L. Although these are indeed buttons and one can push them in any finite
pattern by forcing over L, for true independence one must be able to continue to control
the buttons independently also in all the forcing extensions of L. And while any two of
the buttons can be controlled independently in this way, what Rittberg had noticed was
that if L[G] is a generic extension of L in which 2ω is at least ℵ3 and cardinals have not
been collapsed, then the usual collapse forcing of ℵL2 to ℵ
L
1 will also collapse ℵ
L
3 . So it isn’t
clear how to push b2 over such a model while pushing neither b1 nor b3. It appears to be a
subtle question in forcing whether it is always possible to do so. So we do not actually know
whether the original buttons of [9, lemma 6.1] are independent over L or not.
Once this problem came to light, a variety of other families of independent buttons were
provided. Indeed, we had already in the original article provided an alternative correct
family of independent buttons and switches just after [9, theorem29], and we shall presently
explain these again more fully below. Rittberg himself provided an independent family of
buttons in his Master’s thesis [16, § 2.4.2] with a full proof of their independence over L:
bRn := at least one of ℵ
L
3n, ℵ
L
3n+1, and ℵ
L
3n+2 is not a cardinal, or |℘(ℵ
L
3n)| > |ℵ
L
3n+1|.
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Friedman, Fuchino and Sakai [4, § 5] have another family of independent buttons, namely, if
T Ln denotes the L-least ℵn-Suslin tree, then any finite subfamily of the assertions
bFSS,1n := ℵ
L
n is not a cardinal or T
L
n is not an ℵn-Suslin tree
is an independent family of buttons over L. Furthermore, they show that the simpler state-
ments
bFSS,2n := there is an injection from ℵ
L
n+2 to ℘(ℵ
L
n)
form an infinite family of independent buttons over L. For the sake of completeness, let us
give a full proof here of the independence of the alternative buttons from our original paper:
b∗n := Sn is no longer stationary,
where ωL1 =
⊔
n∈ω Sn is the L-least partition of ω
L
1 into ω many disjoint stationary sets (cf. [9,
theorem29]). The independence of these buttons is based on our ability to control whether
a set or its complement remains stationary in a forcing extension.
Lemma 17 (Baumgartner, Harrington, Kleinberg [12, thm23.8, ex 23.6]). If S ⊆ ω1 is
stationary, then the club-shooting forcing for S, consisting of the closed bounded subsets of
S ordered by end-extension, adds a club subset of S, is countably distributive, and preserves
all stationary subsets of S.
Proof. Let QS be the club-shooting forcing for S. Since S is unbounded, it is dense that the
conditions become unbounded in S, and so the union of the generic filter in QS is a closed
unbounded subset of S. Suppose that T ⊆ S is stationary in the ground model, and suppose
c0  τ is a club subset of ωˇ1. Since T is stationary, we may find a countable elementary
substructure X ≺ Hθ for some large θ, with c0, τ, S, T ∈ X and δ = X ∩ ω1 ∈ T . Since X is
countable, we may build a descending sequence c0 > c1 > · · · of conditions in QS ∩X that
get inside every open dense set in X . The limit condition c =
⋃
n cn∪{δ} is a condition in QS
precisely because δ ∈ T ⊆ S. Since c is X-generic, it follows that c decides the values of any
name in X for a countable sequence of ordinals, and consequently the forcing is countably
distributive. Similarly, c forces that τ is unbounded in δ, and consequently c forces that
δ ∈ τ and hence forces that τ meets Tˇ . Thus, every stationary subset of S is preserved to
the extension. 
The independence of the buttons b∗n for forcing over L now follows as an easy consequence.
Namely, each b∗n is a pure button, since non-stationarity is upward absolute, and we may
in any case push all the buttons by collapsing ω1. More delicately, we may push just b
∗
n by
forcing as in the lemma to shoot a club through the complement of Sn, that is, with the
club-shooting forcing for
⊔
m6=n Sm. Lemma 17 exactly ensures that this forcing preserves
the stationarity of any remaining stationary Sm for m 6= n, and thus ensures that we may
push b∗n while not inadvertently pushing any other unpushed b
∗
m. Meanwhile, the statements
sk asserting “2
ℵk = ℵk+1” are switches that can be controlled independently for k > 1 by
countably closed forcing, which does not affect the stationarity of any subset of ω1 and
therefore does not interfere with the buttons b∗n. So we have the desired independent family
of buttons and switches for forcing over L.
Higher analogues of these buttons exist on higher cardinals, where one has a stationary
subset S ⊆ Cofκ ∩κ
+ for κ regular and seeks to add by forcing a club set C such that
C ∩Cofκ ⊆ S. The natural forcing to accomplish this is <κ-closed and ≤ κ-distributive, and
the analogue of lemma 17 goes through.
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5. Applications to various specific classes of forcing
In this section, we apply the results of §§ 3 and 4 and determine the valid principles of
forcing for various specific natural classes of forcing.
5.1. Our classes of forcing notions. For any ordinal θ, the collapse poset Coll(ω, θ)
consists of the finite partial functions from ω to θ, ordered by inclusion. For any nonzero
ordinal θ, forcing with this poset adds a function from ω onto θ, making it countable in
the forcing extension. Similarly, for any ordinal θ, let Add(ω, θ) be the set of finite partial
functions from θ×ω into 2 and adds θ many Cohen reals. Let Coll be the class of all forcing
notions Q that are forcing equivalent to Coll(ω, θ) for some ordinal θ and Add be the class of
all forcing notions Q that are forcing equivalent to Add(ω, θ) for some ordinal θ. Note that
both Coll and Add include trivial forcing, since Add(ω, 0) = Coll(ω, 0) = {∅} is trivial (and
also Coll(ω, 1) is forcing equivalent to trivial forcing). Also note that Add(ω, 1) is isomorphic
to Coll(ω, 2).
Let us say that a forcing notion Q necessarily collapses θ to ω if every forcing extension by
Q has a function from ω onto θ that is not in the ground model. A forcing notion Q absorbs
a forcing notion R, if Q is forcing equivalent to R ∗ S˙ for some (quotient) forcing S˙. This
is equivalent to saying that R is forcing equivalent to a complete subalgebra of the Boolean
algebra of Q.
Lemma 18 (Folklore). Suppose that θ is any infinite ordinal.
(1) Up to forcing equivalence, Coll(ω, θ) is the unique forcing notion of size |θ| necessarily
collapsing θ to ω.
(2) Coll(ω, θ) absorbs every forcing notion of size |θ|.
(3) Coll(ω, θ) ∗ Coll(ω, λ) is forcing equivalent to Coll(ω,max{θ, λ}).
Proof. (1). Suppose that Q is a forcing notion of size |θ| that necessarily collapses θ to ω.
We may assume without loss of generality that Q is separative, since the separative quotient
of Q is forcing equivalent to it and no larger in size. Below every condition in Q, we claim
that there is an antichain of size θ. If θ is countable, this is immediate since every nontrivial
forcing notion has infinite antichains; if θ is uncountable, then any failure of this claim would
mean that Q is θ-c.c. below some condition and consequently unable to collapse θ to ω below
that condition, contrary to our assumption. Since forcing with Q adds a function from ω
onto θ and Q has size θ, there is a name g˙ forced to be a function from ω onto the generic
filter G˙. We build a refining sequence of maximal antichains An ⊆ Q as follows. Begin with
A0 = {1}. If An is defined, then let An+1 be a maximal antichain of conditions such that
every condition in An splits into θ many elements of An+1, and such that every element of
An+1 decides the value g˙(nˇ). The union R =
⋃
nAn is clearly isomorphic as a subposet of Q
to the tree θ<ω, and so it is forcing equivalent to Coll(ω, θ). Furthermore, we claim that R is
dense in Q. To see this, fix any condition q ∈ Q. Since q forces that q is in G˙, there is some
p ≤ q and natural number n such that p Q g˙(nˇ) = qˇ. Since An+1 is a maximal antichain,
there is some condition r ∈ An+1 that is compatible with p. Since r also decides the value
of g˙(nˇ) and is compatible with p, it must be that r  g˙(nˇ) = qˇ also. In particular, r forces
qˇ ∈ G˙, and so by separativity it must be that r ≤ q. So R is dense in Q, as desired. Thus, Q
is forcing equivalent to R, which we have said is forcing equivalent to Coll(ω, θ), as desired.
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(2). Suppose that Q has size θ. Since Q×Coll(ω, θ) also has size θ and necessarily collapses
θ to ω, it follows that it is forcing equivalent to Coll(ω, θ). Thus, Q is absorbed by Coll(ω, θ).
We point out also that the quotient forcing is Coll(ω, θ), a fact of which we shall later make
use.
(3). For any other ordinal λ, the poset Coll(ω, θ) ∗ Coll(ω, λ) has size max{θ, λ} and
necessarily collapses this ordinal to ω. 
Lemma 19. The collapse forcing class Coll is a linear forcing class, which is also persistent
and closed under products.
Proof. We have already pointed out that Coll includes trivial forcing, and so Coll is reflexive.
It is transitive by lemma 18 (3). The same fact shows that it is linear, since the larger of
Coll(ω, λ) and Coll(ω, θ) factors through the smaller, and the quotient is collapse forcing.
Finally, we observe that because the conditions are finite, the poset Coll(ω, θ) is absolute to
all models of set theory having the ordinal θ, and so Coll is persistent. It is closed under
products, since Coll(ω, θ)×Coll(ω, λ) has size max {θ, λ} and necessarily collapses max {θ, λ}
to ω, so by lemma 18 it is forcing equivalent to Coll(ω,max {θ, λ}). 
Lemma 20. The class of Cohen forcing Add is a linear forcing class, which is also persistent
and closed under products.
Proof. This class is reflexive since Add(ω, 0) is trivial and transitive since Add(ω, θ)∗Add(ω, λ)
is forcing equivalent to Add(ω, θ + λ). It has the linearity property because if θ < λ, then
Add(ω, θ) ∗Add(ω, λ) is forcing equivalent to Add(ω, λ). It is persistent since the definition
of Add(ω, θ) is absolute to all models having θ as an ordinal. It is closed under products
since Add(ω, θ)×Add(ω, λ) ∼= Add(ω, θ + λ). 
The Le´vy collapse poset Coll(ω, <λ) is defined to be the finite support product
∏
α<λ Coll(ω, α)
and collapses all ordinals below λ to ω. This has particularly nice features when λ is an inac-
cessible cardinal, but we may consider it for any ordinal λ. The class of Le´vy collapse forcing,
denoted Coll<, is the class of all forcing notions that are forcing equivalent to Coll(ω, <λ)
for some ordinal λ.
Lemma 18 (3) implies that Coll(ω, θ) is forcing equivalent to Coll(ω, <(θ + 1)) for any
ordinal θ, and so Coll ⊆ Coll<. Note that Coll< includes the forcing to add ω1 many Cohen
reals Add(ω, ω1) ∼= Coll(ω, <ω1), as well as the Le´vy collapse Coll(ω, <κ) of any inaccessible
cardinal κ, if there are such cardinals.
Lemma 21. Let θ be an ordinal.
(1) If θ is not a cardinal or is singular, then Coll(ω,<θ) is forcing equivalent to Coll(ω, θ).
(2) Coll(ω, <θ) ∗ Coll(ω, <λ) is forcing equivalent to Coll(ω,<max{θ, λ}).
Proof. (1). If θ is not a cardinal or is singular, then Coll(ω,<θ) necessarily collapses θ, and
since this poset has size |θ|, the conclusion follows from lemma 18.
(2). This follows from lemma 18 by combining the posets at the common stages. 
In general, if κ is a cardinal, we can consider collapse-to-κ forcing class Collκ, which consists
of all forcing of the form Coll(κ, θ), where θ is any ordinal. Since we want to interpret the
class in any model of set theory, we shall consider Collκ only when κ is a definable regular
cardinal, whose definition is absolute to all Collκ extensions. For example, we shall consider
Collω1 and Collω2, and so on.
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Lemma 22. For any absolutely definable regular cardinal κ, the class Collκ is a linear forcing
class, which is also persistent and closed under products.
Proof. The class Collκ is reflexive, since Coll(κ, 0) = {∅} is trivial. The class is transitive,
since Coll(κ, λ) ∗Coll(κ, θ) is forcing equivalent to Coll(κ,max{ λ, θ }) by an argument anal-
ogous to lemma 18. The same fact shows that Collκ is linear. Since the definition of κ is
absolute and posets in Collκ do not add new sets of size less than κ, it follows that Collκ is
persistent. From this and transitivity, it follows that Collκ is closed under products. 
In the same spirit, we define the class of all κ-Cohen forcing, denoted by Addκ, consisting
of all forcing notions of the form Add(κ, θ), the poset to add θ many Cohen subsets to κ,
having conditions that are partial functions from θ× κ to 2 of size less than κ. We consider
this class only when κ is a definable regular cardinal, whose definition is absolute to all
Addκ extensions. In this case, the class Addκ is a linear forcing class by essentially the same
argument as in lemma 20.
A forcing notion P has essential size δ, if the complete Boolean algebra corresponding to
P has size δ and P is not forcing equivalent to any Q whose complete Boolean algebra has
smaller size. If W is any model of set theory, we can define the forcing distance from L as
the least L-cardinal δ such that W can be written as L[G] where G is P-generic over L for a
forcing notion P of essential size δ. We write fdL = δ in this case.
Lemma 23. If W |= fdL = δ and H is Q-generic over W for some Q ∈ W , then W [H ] |=
fdL ≥ δ.
Proof. Let W [H ] = L[G] for some G which is P-generic over L for some P ∈ L and let B be
the complete Boolean algebra corresponding to P. Since L ⊆ W ⊆ W [H ] = L[G], we know
(by [12, lemma 15.43]) that there is a subalgebra C of B such that W = L[G′] for some G′
which is C-generic over L. We assumed that fdWL = δ, and thus |C|
L ≥ δ. Since C was a
subalgebra of B, we have that |B|L ≥ δ. 
5.2. The modal logic of collapse forcing. We aim to determine the provably valid prin-
ciples of collapse forcing. Lemma 19 and theorem 7 give us S4.3 as a lower bound.
Theorem 24. If ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provably valid principles of collapse forc-
ing Coll are exactly those in S4.3.
Proof. For the upper bound, we shall show that Coll admits a long ratchet over the con-
structible universe L. For each non-zero ordinal α, let rα be the statement “ℵ
L
α is countable.”
These statements form a long ratchet for collapse forcing over the constructible universe L,
since any collapse extension L[G] collapses an initial segment of the cardinals of L to ω,
and in any such extension in which ℵLα is not yet collapsed, the forcing to collapse it will
not yet collapse ℵLα+1. Thus, by theorem 12, the valid principles of collapse forcing over L
are contained within S4.3. So the valid principles of collapse forcing over L are precisely
S4.3, and if ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provably valid principles of collapse forcing are
exactly S4.3. 
Theorem 25. If Γ is a transitive reflexive forcing class and necessarily Coll ⊆ Γ, then the
valid principles of Γ forcing over L contain S4.2 and are contained within S4.3.
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Proof. Suppose that Γ is a transitive reflexive forcing class necessarily containing collapse
forcing. By lemma 18, it follows that every poset is absorbed by any sufficiently large collapse
poset, and so Γ is directed. Thus, by theorem 7, the modal theory S4.2 is valid for Γ forcing
over any model of set theory.
Let us now establish the upper bound of S4.3 by finding a long ratchet over the con-
structible universe L. For each nonzero ordinal α, let rα be the assertion “Some L cardinal
above ℵLα is collapsed.” Clearly, these statements are all false in L, each implies its own
necessity, each implies the previous, and if rα+1 is not yet true in a forcing extension L[G],
then we may collapse ℵLα+1 without collapsing any larger cardinal, making rα ∧ ¬rα+1 true.
So these statements form a long ratchet over L, and therefore, by theorem 12, the valid
principles of Γ forcing over L are included within S4.3. 
Corollary 26. If ZFC is consistent and Γ is a linear forcing class containing collapse forcing
Coll, then the ZFC-provably valid principles of Γ forcing are exactly S4.3.
Proof. If Γ is a linear forcing class, then S4.3 is valid by theorem 7. And the validities are
contained with S4.3 by the previous theorem. 
Theorem 27. If ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provably valid principles of Le´vy collapse
forcing Coll< is exactly S4.3.
Proof. It follows by lemma 21 that Coll< is a linear forcing class containing Coll, and so this
theorem is an instance of corollary 26. 
Theorem 28. If ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provably valid principles of collapse-to-κ
forcing, for any absolutely definable regular cardinal κ, are exactly S4.3.
Proof. By lemma 22, the collapse-to-κ forcing class Collκ is a linear forcing class, and so by
theorem 7, every S4.3 assertion is valid for collapse-to-κ forcing. Conversely, consider κ as it
is defined in L, namely, κL = ℵLβ for some ordinal β. For each nonzero ordinal α, let rα be the
assertion “some L-cardinal above ℵLβ+α is collapsed.” Just as in the previous section, these
form a long ratchet for collapse-to-κ forcing over L, because in any Collκ forcing extension
L[G], if no cardinals above ℵLβ+α are collapsed, then we can collapse ℵ
L
β+α to κ without
collapsing any larger L-cardinals. By theorem 12, it follows that the valid principles of
collapse-to-κ forcing over L are contained within S4.3. Thus, if ZFC is consistent, it follows
that the ZFC-provably valid principles of collapse-to-κ forcing are exactly S4.3. 
Theorem 29. Suppose that Γ is a transitive reflexive forcing class, with the property that
there is a definable proper class C of cardinals in L, such that in any forcing extension L[G]
by a forcing notion in Γ having essential size δ0 and any larger δ ∈ C, there is a forcing
notion in ΓL[G] having essential size δ. Then the valid principles of Γ forcing over L are
contained within S4.3.
Proof. We shall construct a long ratchet. For each nonzero ordinal α, let wα be the assertion
“fdL is bigger than the αth element of C”. By lemma 23, each statement wα is an unpushed
pure button in L. Our assumptions on Γ and C ensure that if a set forcing extension L[G] does
not yet satisfy wα, then wα ∧ ¬wα+1 is Γ forceable. Finally, since any set forcing extension
L[G] was obtained by forcing of some size, no such extension can satisfy all wα. Thus, this
is indeed a long ratchet, and so the valid principles of Γ forcing over L are contained within
S4.3 by theorem 12. 
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Theorem 30. If Γ is any reflexive transitive forcing class necessarily containing Collκ for
some Γ-absolutely definable regular cardinal κ, then the valid principles for Γ forcing over L
are contained within S4.3.
Proof. Suppose that Γ and κ are as stated. Check that the conditions of theorem 29 are
satisfied: The fact that κ is Γ-absolutely definable guarantees that C := {(κ+
(α)
)L : α ∈ Ord}
is a definable proper class; if L[G] is a Γ extension of essential size δ0 < δ ∈ C, then
Coll(κ, δ) ∈ Γ has essential size δ. Now the claim follows from theorem 29. 
5.3. The modal logic of Cohen forcing.
Theorem 31. If ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provably valid principles of Cohen forcing
Add are exactly S4.3.
Proof. By lemma 20, the class Add is a linear forcing class, and so the valid principles of
Cohen forcing include S4.3 by theorem 7. For the upper bound, we shall construct a long
ratchet for Cohen forcing over L. For each nonzero ordinal α, let rα be the statement that
2ω > ℵLα. By adding additional subsets to ω, we can push up the value of the continuum
to any such prescribed degree. And in any Cohen extension of L, all cardinals have been
preserved, so the continuum can be pushed up so as to realize any particular ℵLβ+1 above the
current size of the continuum, thereby forcing rβ ∧¬rβ+1. Thus, this is indeed a long ratchet
for Cohen forcing Add over L, and so by theorem 12, the valid principles of Cohen forcing
over L are contained within S4.3, and consequently are exactly equal to S4.3. In particular,
if ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provably valid principles of Cohen forcing are exactly
S4.3. 
As mentioned above, the class Addκ is a linear forcing class, and therefore S4.3 is always
valid for Addκ forcing.
Theorem 32. If κ is an absolutely definable regular cardinal, then the valid principles of
κ-Cohen forcing Addκ over L are exactly S4.3. Consequently, if ZFC is consistent, then the
ZFC-provably valid principles of κ-Cohen forcing are exactly S4.3.
Proof. This argument proceeds as in theorem 28, but using the analogue of the long ratchet
of theorem 31. As mentioned, S4.3 is always valid for Addκ forcing. Conversely, consider κ
as defined in L, which must be ℵLβ for some ordinal β. For each nonzero ordinal α, let rα
be the statement that 2κ > ℵLβ+α. This is a long ratchet over L with respect to Addκ, since
we can always push up 2κ to attain any particular higher cardinal value, and since Addκ
forcing does not collapse cardinals over Addκ extensions L[G], once rα is true in an Addκ
extension, it remains true in all further extensions. Thus, by theorem 12, the valid principles
of Addκ forcing over L are contained within S4.3, and therefore are in fact equal to S4.3. It
follows that if ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provably valid principles of Addκ forcing are
precisely those in S4.3. 
5.4. Upper bounds for other classes of forcing. We shall now apply theorem 29 to
other forcing classes:
Corollary 33. The valid principles of forcing over L for each of the following forcing classes
is contained within S4.3. For none of the forcing classes do the validities over L include S4.2.
(1) c.c.c. forcing.
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(2) Proper forcing.
(3) Semi-proper forcing.
(4) Stationary-preserving forcing.
(5) ω1-preserving forcing.
(6) Cardinal-preserving forcing.
(7) Countably distributive forcing.
Proof. Each of these classes is easily seen to be transitive and reflexive. Let C be the class of
uncountable successor cardinals of L. For any δ ∈ C, each class contains forcing of essential
size δ. For example, Add(ω, δ) is in classes (1) through (6), and Add(δ, 1) is in class (7).
The same is true in any forcing extension L[G] by set forcing of essential size below δ. Thus,
each class satisfies the requirements of theorem 29, and so the valid principles of forcing in
each case are included within S4.3.
We complete the proof by showing for each of the classes that .2 is not valid over L. Let
ϕ be the assertion “the L-least Souslin tree is a special Aronszajn tree.” This statement
is c.c.c. forceable over L, simply by specializing the tree, and once the statement is true, it
remains true in all ω1-preserving extensions. Consider now the c.c.c. extension L[b] obtained
by forcing to add a branch b through T . In this extension and all subsequent ω1-preserving
extensions, ϕ is false. Since each of the forcing classes in (1) through (6) contains c.c.c. forcing
and is contained within ω1-preserving forcing, this statement ϕ is a violation of axiom .2
with respect to each of the forcing classes. For class (7), we may consider the forcing to kill
the stationary of the L-least stationary co-stationary subset of ω1, or to kill its complement,
and the impossibility of doing both while adding no reals provides a violation of .2. 
The reader can probably extend this list with additional natural forcing classes satisfying
the hypothesis of theorem 29 (the classes of countably closed forcing and more generally,
κ-closed forcing for any fixed absolutely definable cardinal κ, will be covered in § 5.5). Let us
state for the record that we do not currently know the exact forcing validities for any of the
classes listed in corollary 33. Nevertheless, our analysis of the case of ω1-preserving forcing
and cardinal-preserving will be improved in theorem 36.
5.5. Countably closed and κ-closed forcing. We turn now to the class of countably
closed forcing, a highly natural forcing class with robust closure properties, along with its
generalization to <κ-closed forcing. As usual, a forcing notion Q is countably closed if every
decreasing sequence q0 ≥ q1 ≥ · · · has a lower bound in Q. This property is not preserved by
equivalence of forcing (for example, an atomless complete Boolean algebra is never countably
complete, since one may take the supremum of a countable antichain, stripping off one
element in each step), so we understand the class of countably closed forcing to refer to the
class of all forcing notions that are forcing equivalent to a countably closed forcing notion.
Theorem 34. If ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provably valid principles of the class of
countably closed forcing are exactly those in S4.2.
Proof. Since any countably closed forcing notion remains countably closed in any countably
closed extension, it follows that the class of countably closed forcing is persistent. Thus,
by theorem 7, the validities always include S4.2. For the upper bound, consider countably
closed forcing over L. Consider the higher buttons and switches introduced in § 3, either
the higher analogues we mentioned of our own buttons b∗n or the higher buttons of Rittberg,
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or of Friedman, Fuchino and Sakai, which can in each case be controlled independently via
countably closed forcing. Thus, by theorem 13, the valid principles of countably closed forcing
over L are contained within S4.2. In summary, if ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provably
valid principles of countably closed forcing are precisely the assertions of S4.2. 
A forcing notion Q is <κ-closed if every descending sequence in Q of length less than κ
has a lower bound in Q. Thus, the countably closed posets are exactly the <ℵ1-closed. A
cardinal κ is absolutely defined by a formula ϕ in the context of a reflexive transitive forcing
class Γ, if κ is the only object satisfying ϕ(x) in any Γ-forcing extension.
Theorem 35. More generally, if ZFC is consistent, then for any absolutely definable regular
cardinal κ, the ZFC-provably valid principles of κ-closed forcing are exactly those in S4.2.
Proof. Since the class is persistent, we again obtain S4.2 as a lower bound. And for the
upper bound, one may use the higher analogues of the buttons and switches used in theorem
34, by translating them above κ. 
5.6. ω1-preserving forcing. Surely the class of cardinal-preserving forcing and the larger
class of ω1-preserving forcing have been focal points of forcing theory. We have already
observed in corollary 33 that the valid principles of ω1-preserving forcing over L is contained
within S4.3. Here, we prove a stronger conclusion, although the exact modal theory of
validities for this class remains an open question.
Theorem 36. The valid principles of ω1-preserving forcing over L are included within
S4.tBA $ S4.2.
Proof. By theorem 16, it suffices to find arbitrarily large finite strongly independent families
of weak buttons and switches. For this, we may use the same buttons b∗n mentioned in the
context of lemma 17, which are described also in [9, thm29]. These were a independent
family of buttons for the class of all forcing, but for the class of ω1-preserving forcing, they
become a strongly independent family of weak buttons, since in any ω1-preserving extension
L[G], at least one of the sets Sn must still remain stationary, and so not all buttons are
pushed. But subject to this requirement, lemma 17 and the subsequent argument shows
that the buttons can be controlled independently by ω1-preserving forcing. For a family of
switches that is mutually independent of these weak buttons, consider (2ω)L[G], which must
be ℵLω·ξ+k for some ordinal ξ and some natural number k, and let sj assert that the jth binary
digit of k is 1. Since we can force any desired value for k by adding Cohen reals, it follows
that any finite pattern of the sj switches is realizable, by forcing that preserves all stationary
sets, and hence does not inadvertently push any of the unpushed weak buttons bn. Since we
have a strongly independent family of weak buttons, with a mutually independent family of
switches, it follows by theorem 16 that the valid principles of ω1-preserving forcing over L is
contained within S4.tBA. 
We are unsure whether this argument can be extended to the class of cardinal-preserving
forcing, since it seems that in some extensions, the club-shooting forcing could conceivably
collapse cardinals above ω1. Nevertheless, this issue may be solvable by the alternative
method of shooting clubs, via finite conditions, which does preserve all cardinals.
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5.7. CH-preserving forcing. In any model of ZFC+ ϕ, we say that forcing notion Q is ϕ-
preserving, if every forcing extension by Q satisfies ϕ. Note that we consider only ϕ-preserving
forcing in models that actually satisfy ϕ, so by “provably valid principles of ϕ-preserving
forcing”, we mean the ZFC + ϕ-provably valid principles of ϕ-preserving forcing.
Theorem 37. If ZFC is consistent, then the provably valid principles of CH-preserving
forcing, of GCH-preserving forcing and of ¬CH-preserving forcing are all exactly S4.2.
Proof. Let us treat the case of CH first. The class of CH-preserving forcing, over any model
satisfying CH, is easily seen to be reflexive and transitive. So S4 is valid. Let us argue that
.2 is also valid for CH-preserving forcing.
Suppose that V |= CH and V |= ♦ϕ as well. Assume that V does not satisfy .2, that is,
that V |= ¬♦ϕ, or, equivalently, V |= ♦¬ϕ. Then there are CH-preserving extensions
V [G] and V [H ] where V [G] |= ϕ and V [H ] |= ¬ϕ. We may assume without loss of
generality that G and H are mutually V -generic. We don’t know that V [G∗H ] satisfies CH,
so we can’t just directly combine them. But let V [G ∗H ][I] be a further forcing extension
of V [G ∗H ] that does satisfy CH. We claim that V [G ∗H ][I] is the result of CH-preserving
forcing over V [G]. Consider some partial order P such that there is some P-generic J such
that V [G ∗ H ][I] = V [G][J ]. Since this model satisfies CH, there is some p ∈ J such that
p forces CH. Let Pp be the poset P below p, i.e., Pp is CH-preserving. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that J is Pp-generic, thus yielding the claim. Thus, V [G ∗H ][I]
is obtained from V [G] by CH-preserving forcing, satisfying both ϕ and ¬ϕ, a contradiction.
Thus, V satisfies .2 as desired, and by observation 5, V satisfied  .2. Since the class of
CH-preserving forcings is closed under iterations, the Kripke model corresponding to every
forcing translation is transitive. Hence, by observation 6, this means that S4.2 is valid in V
for CH-preserving forcing, thus (since V was arbitrary) giving the lower bound.
For the upper bound, consider CH-preserving forcing over L. We may use the independent
family of buttons and switches for L presented in § 4, which work just as well for CH-
preserving forcing, and so by theorem 13 the valid principles of CH-preserving forcing over
L are contained within S4.2. So they are exactly S4.2.
Essentially the same argument works in the case of ¬CH-preserving forcing, by means of
the higher analogues of the buttons and switches, which can be controlled with highly closed
and therefore ¬CH-preserving forcing. For GCH-preserving forcing, however, we shall need
to use different switches. To find them, consider any forcing extension L[G], and let β be
the least ordinal such that there are no L-generic Cohen subsets in L[G] of any cardinal
above ℵLβ . The ordinal β can be written uniquely in the form ω · α + k for some ordinal α
and k < ω. Let sm be the statement that the mth binary digit of k is 1. These form an
independent family of switches (and independent from the buttons bn above), because by
adding a Cohen set up high, we can realize any desired natural number k, and hence realize
any desired finite pattern in the switches. (Alternatively, we could build a long ratchet with
a similar method, mutually independent from the buttons bn, and this also suffices.) 
5.8. The modal logic of c.c.c. forcing. The class of c.c.c. forcing is the pre-eminent
forcing class, noticed already in the earliest days of forcing as a central notion. Since the
class of c.c.c. partial orders is not closed under the equivalence of forcing (for example,
every poset is forcing equivalent to very large lottery sums of the poset with itself), let
us understand the class of c.c.c. forcing to consist of all forcing notions that are forcing
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equivalent to a c.c.c. partial order. In corollary 33, we observed that the valid principles of
c.c.c. forcing over L are contained within S4.3 and do not contain S4.2. But we do not know
the exact modal theory of c.c.c. forcing validities over L or the class of ZFC-provably valid
principles of c.c.c. forcing.
Theorem 38. If MAω1 holds, then S4.2 is valid for c.c.c. forcing.
Proof. Since the class of c.c.c. forcing is clearly reflexive and transitive, it follows by theorem
7 at least that S4 is valid. Martin’s axiom MAω1 implies that c.c.c. forcing in V is persistent,
that is, every c.c.c. poset in V remains c.c.c. in every c.c.c. extension of V [12, theorem
16.21]. This exactly shows that axiom .2 is valid for c.c.c. forcing in V . As in the proof of
theorem 37, observations 5 and 6 give us that S4.2 is valid for c.c.c. forcing in every model
of MAω1. 
It should be pointed out that the (modal logic) proof of theorem 38 hides the set-theoretic
fact that the MAω1 hypothesis is rather fragile, and easily destroyed by c.c.c. forcing (e.g.,
adding a Cohen real creates Souslin trees and therefore destroys MA). Our theorem tells us
that S4.2 will continue to be valid in all further c.c.c. forcing extensions of a model of MAω1 ,
even though such extensions may no longer have MAω1 . (In particular, it means that while
Souslin trees are created, they cannot be definable in a way that allows us to create the
counterexamples to .2, as in corollary 33).
The argument generalizes beyond c.c.c. forcing to any transitive reflexive forcing class Γ.
Namely, if such a Γ is persistent in some model V , then it will continue to satisfy S4.2 in all Γ
extensions V [G], even if the interpretation of Γ in those later models is no longer persistent.
Finally, we remark that in order to prove that the ZFC +MAω1-provably valid principles
of c.c.c. forcing are exactly S4.2, it would be sufficient to identify arbitrarily large finite
families of independent c.c.c.-buttons and switches over the Solovay-Tennenbaum model
L[G] of MA + ¬CH.
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